Kitty genovese trial

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Watch Trailer. More Info. Rather, the burden is on the State to make a "particularized showing of prejudice," id. See Thomas, F. Ward, F.

Significantly, this claim of prejudice applies only to the inability to defend the habeas corpus petition, not to the difficulty of retrying the petitioner. Vasquez, U. If the state does establish prejudice resulting from the petitioner's delay, the burden shifts to the petitioner to either successfully refute the state's assertion of prejudice or show that the delayed petition is "based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.

See also Thomas, F. Respondent argues that the following facts prejudice the State: 1 the death on April 28, of Frank Cacciatore, Esq.

In light of the Court's denial of the habeas petition, however, the issue of prejudice to the State under Rule 9 a is rendered academic. In United States v. Levy, 25 F. Sullivan, U. Malpiedi, 62 F. Burney, F. Arkansas, U. Moseley claims that Sparrow's statements regarding his prior representation of Genoveseboth in open court during the sentencing proceeding and in Justice Shapiro's chambers [10] and his admission to the jury of his lack of objectivity mandated inquiry by the trial court, and its failure to do so requires automatic reversal.

The Court finds troublesome the resolution of whether the trial court had sufficient facts during the pre-sentence phase of the trial to trigger judicial inquiry, for at that time Sparrow had only disclosed his prior representation of Genovese, see Strouse v. Leonardo, F. In any event, respondent argues that even if the disclosure and admission give rise to such a duty under current law, the law applicable at the time Moseley's conviction became final did not require such a result.

He further argues that retroactive application of current law would run afoul of the Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, U. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that respondent is correct. While the Court declined to "define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes," it noted that "a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.

In other words, as the Teague Court explained, "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Subsequently, a majority of the Court adopted Teague 's analysis.

See Penry v. Lynaugh, U. West, U. In post- Teague decisions, the Court further defined the "new rule" doctrine. McKellar, U. Smith, U. Consequently, when a court applies a prior decision "in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent," a new rule has been created. Stringer v. Black, U. Only a few months ago, in Ciak, the Second Circuit took the opportunity to examine the origins of the automatic reversal rule articulated in Levy. The court held that, although Levy provided a detailed discussion of the rule, its origins for the proposition that automatic reversal must occur where a trial court fails to inquire regarding a potential conflict of which "it was aware or should have been aware" derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Cuyler, issued in Ciak, 59 F.

Indeed, the Ciak court noted that Wood v. Moseley, through appointed counsel, concedes the point, stating: "The [automatic reversal] rule was first clearly enunciated in Wood, and originated in Cuyler. Despite this concession, Moseley argues that "[t]he rule McMann, F.

United States, F. These cases, however, do not support Moseley's position. The Olshen court merely stated that "[a]lthough some judicial initiative is probably advisable when the possibility of a prejudicial conflict is apparent Likewise, although the court in Lollar expressed concern for the failure of the trial court to conduct an inquiry regarding the defense counsel's joint representation of co-defendants, the court did not automatically reverse the conviction; rather, it required a showing that the appellant suffered prejudice from the joint representation, a position dissented to by one judge who, instead, advocated automatic reversal.

Surely, these decisions do not establish that the automatic reversal rule had origins that pre-date the rule's enunciation in Wood and Cuyler such that they "dictated" the rule's creation. Teague, U. Moreover, an examination of other decisions issued prior to Wood and Cuyler reveal sharp disagreement among the circuits regarding the existence and scope, if any, of a duty to inquire.

Cuyler itself noted this disagreement by explaining that "[a]lthough some Circuits have said explicitly that the Sixth Amendment does not require an inquiry into the possibility of conflicts, Fogg, F.

Likewise, in Holloway v. See also United States v. Mavrick, F. Lawriw, F. Indeed, from through , at least five circuits had, at one time or another, issued decisions supporting the propositions that either a trial court had no affirmative duty to inquire into possible conflicts absent an objection or, if the trial court had such a duty, the failure to do so did not mandate automatic reversal.

See, e. Steele, F. We decline to adopt such a rule Paz-Sierra, F. This debate was resolved only with Cuyler and Wood, indicating that those decisions created the rule in question. Moseley's reliance on Glasser v. United States, U. Glasser, a multiple representation case, involved a defendant who had specifically requested counsel separate from his co-defendant, and his attorney had disclosed potential inconsistencies in the joint defense to the trial court. Thus, Glasser merely falls into the category of cases in which a specific objection by defense counsel or defendant may require a trial court's inquiry.

Indeed, Cuyler itself noted that the issue of "whether a state trial judge must inquire into the propriety of multiple representations even though no party lodges an objection" was unresolved, a question it answered in the affirmative.

Glasser thus neither created nor dictated the creation of the automatic reversal rule. For all of these reasons, the Court holds that Cuyler, as interpreted by Wood, "extend[ed] precedent," Stringer, U. This rule, established years after Moseley's conviction on June 11, and the affirmance with sentence modification on June 1, , "was not dictated by precedent existing at the time [his] conviction became final. There exists, however, "two narrow exceptions" to the non-retroactivity principle formulated in Teague.

Caspari v. Collins, U. Parks, U. Here, as in Graham and Saffle, "this exception has no application In other words, the exception applies only to those "bedrock procedural elements" which are "central to an accurate determination of guilt or innocence.

Stumes, U. Therefore, the exception is further limited only "to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. In light of these principles, the Court concludes that the second exception is inapplicable to permit retroactive application of the automatic reversal rule. First, despite the pronouncements of Cuyler and Wood, the rule was only recently applied in the Second Circuit compare United States v. Edwardo-Franco, F. Cain v.

Redman, F. Chrans, F. Kentucky, U. Second, a number of circuits in post- Cuyler and Wood decisions have explicitly declined to apply the rule. See United States v. Winkle, F. Knight, F. Ford, F. Marrera, F. This continuing disagreement is additional evidence that the rule does not fall within the exception's "small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Third, since the automatic reversal rule overturns otherwise perfectly valid determinations of guilt without the need to demonstrate an adverse affect of any possible conflict on counsel's performance or dereliction in the adjudicatory process, in many cases the rule does not "seriously" increase the likelihood of accurate convictions.

Indeed, as discussed more fully below, even after full hearing there exists no evidence in the record that Sparrow's performance was defective as a result of the purported conflict of interest. See infra Part II. In light of the truly overwhelming proof of Moseley's guilt, the application of the rule here to reverse his conviction would not serve to advance significantly the accuracy of that determination.

Fourth, the mere fact that the rule touches on a defendant's right to representation at trial does not require the conclusion that it falls within the exception, for if this fact alone sufficed, then many rules or proposed rules would avoid the dictates of Teague. Unlike other rules pertaining to the Sixth Amendment which seek to ensure competent performance of counsel and prejudice-free outcomes, see, e.

Washington, U. Therefore, blind application of the exception to rules pertaining to ineffective representation would fail to distinguish between "bedrock" rules and other rules, thereby greatly expanding the limited nature of the exception. Moreover, different rules touching upon equally fundamental concepts do not automatically fall within the exception. Whitley, F. Finally, retroactive application of the automatic reversal rule would undoubtedly affect a great number of otherwise final convictions because of trial courts' reliance on then-prevailing caselaw that no duty existed to inquire into possible conflicts absent objection.

Hence, reversal of decades-old murder and other convictions for prisoners serving life sentences, for example, would occur with little chance of retrial. As Justice Harlan stated in Mackey v. The invocation of an exception to the Teague doctrine is not here appropriate.

Having determined that there exists no procedural bar to the Court's consideration of Moseley's claim on its merits, and that he is not entitled to "automatic reversal," the Court now undertakes a merit-based analysis. Such a right is violated when a defendant's "attorney has 1 a potential conflict of interest that result[s] in prejudice to the defendant, or 2 an actual conflict of interest that adversely affect[s] the attorney's performance.

An attorney operates under a potential conflict of interest if his own interests " may diverge at some point [with his client's] so as to place the attorney under inconsistent duties," Cuyler, U.

Lussier, 64 F. Keane, 7 F. The Court concludes that Sparrow labored under neither a potential conflict which prejudiced Moseley nor an actual conflict which adversely affected his performance. In Cuyler, the Supreme Court foreclosed ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the "potential conflict" prong from defendants who fail to object to possible conflicts during trial, stating that "a defendant who raise[s] no objection at trial [to a possible conflict] must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.

Courts have applied this foreclosure rule to bar consideration of potential conflict claims arising from, inter alia, an attorney's alleged friendship with a testifying drug enforcement officer, Simon v.

United States v. Soto Hernandez, F. Application of this bar to a defendant who failed to object to his attorney's possible conflict raises questions closely resembling those addressed by the Second Circuit in Billy-Eko, see supra Part II.

Even if this bar were not to apply to Moseley who offered no objection to Sparrow at trial and, indeed, continued to retain him for his post-verdict motion and appeal , Moseley could still not establish ineffective assistance under the potential conflict prong. Assuming that Sparrow's prior representation of Genovese created a possible conflict, Moseley suffered no consequent prejudice. In order to establish prejudice resulting from a potential conflict, a habeas corpus petitioner must demonstrate that there exists a "reasonable probability that but for counsel's [possible conflict], the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Fulton, 5 F. Moseley's counsel concedes that this burden has not been met, arguing instead that Moseley's claim rests exclusively on the automatic reversal rule:.

As discussed above, however, Moseley's automatic reversal rule argument lacks merit, and, in light of the above concession, so does any argument that Moseley suffered prejudice as a result of Sparrow's presumed potential conflict of interest. Even without this concession, however, prejudice could not be demonstrated, for as discussed below, despite his apparent statements to the contrary, Sparrow gave Moseley effective, competent and capable counsel under difficult circumstances.

In Strouse, the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether a habeas corpus petitioner's trial counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest due to the counsel's prior representation of a murder victim. Indeed, the victim in that case was the petitioner's own mother and his lawyer's prior representation of the mother consisted of not one matter handled years earlier, but three separate, unrelated mattersincluding drafting the mother's willover the course of a number of years.

Despite the obvious intimate ties between the mother and lawyer, the court held that no actual conflict of interest existed, stating conclusively: "We can discern no way in which this prior work for [the mother] created a conflict in [the lawyer's] representation of [the petitioner] at his murder trial. Similarly, in Crisp v. Duckworth, F. See also Kirkpatrick v. Butler, F.

Even where the lawyer does not inform his client of his prior representation of the murder victim, habeas corpus relief will not be granted in the absence of demonstrable proof of an actual conflict of interest.

Quarles, F. These cases demonstrate that Sparrow did not labor under an actual conflict of interest as a result of his prior representation of Genovese. He met Genovese for the first time in the hallway of the court-house on the day of her triala trial lasting only five minutes H.

After the appeal, which comprised argument of pure legal issues not requiring communication with Genovese H. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence regarding Sparrow's representation of Genovese establishes only the barest of contact between lawyer and client. Moreover, unlike cases where the victim testifies for the prosecution and the defendant's counsel is conflicted by the obligation to maintain attorney-client confidences and the need to cross-examine effectively, here the victim was dead, thereby negating even the possibility of any such conflict.

Castillo v. After Moseley had been convicted, the United States Supreme Court had decided a number of cases making it clear that a criminal defendant was entitled to be represented by a conflict-free lawyer.

Sparrow had represented Genovese when she had been prosecuted on gambling charges. Moreover, I had read the transcript of Moseley's trial and was shocked that Sparrow had told the jury during the sentencing phase -- to determine whether Moseley should be put to death -- that "I didn't try this case involving Kitty Genovese objectively, calmly, just as a lawyer defending a client because I knew Kitty Genovese and represented her for years.

I had no choice. I conducted the hearing on July 24, It was the first time a case of mine would make big news and that my name would hit the papers.

The press reported that I had said in court that, "I have a responsibility as a federal judge to not let [the government] sweep this under the rug. I anticipated that I would be vilified in the press. I had doubts that people would be able to detach their emotions and accept the fact that a judge is bound to adhere to the rule of law. I was right.

The New York Post , for example, wrote that "the very fact that this absurd appeal had actually made it into court demonstrates, in graphic terms, the sorry state of the criminal justice system: The mythical man from Mars would shake his head and marvel at the prospect that Kitty Genovese -- a full 31 years after she was murdered -- stands to be denied justice. During the hearing, three of Kitty Genovese's brothers and a sister sat in the first row and stared down at their sister's killer.

Kitty's sister later told the press that she "was shocked to hear that this case would be reopened. Sparrow, who was then 82, testified about the way in which he handled the case. He had kept copious notes. I was impressed. In a lengthy, page decision I denied Moseley's habeas petition, concluding that, despite Sparrow's statements to the contrary, he gave Moseley "effective, competent and capable counsel under difficult circumstances. As a new judge, I was thrilled that the appellate court summarily affirmed "for substantially the reasons stated in the district court's thorough and well-reasoned opinion.